TBILISI, Georgia — Georgia on Wednesday accused Russian authorities of illegally detaining five Georgian fishermen and demanded their immediate release.
The Georgian Foreign Ministry said five men were detained Tuesday while fishing in Georgian territorial Black Sea waters off the town of Anaklia. It said the Russian authorities accused the men of illegal fishing.
"A chain of Russia's extremely dangerous and dirty provocations still continues, and it has acquired a clear form of hunting people," the ministry said in a statement.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko said that Russian coast guard detained nine fishermen off the Black Sea coast of Abkhazia and handed them over to Abkhaz authorities. He said those detained lacked proper IDs and fishing permits.
Neither Russian nor Georgian officials offered any explanation of the differing figures.
Moscow has recognized Georgian breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent nations following a five-day Russian-Georgian war last year. Russia has deployed its troops to both regions, and Russia's coast guard also patrol Abkhazia's Black Sea coast.
Nicaragua and Venezuela are the only nations that have followed suit in recognizing of the two regions' independence. The U.S., the EU and the rest of the world consider them part of Georgia.
Georgia also accused the Russian troops in Georgia's breakaway province of Abkhazia of firing on a minibus that carried a four-year-old child to a hospital along with several other people. The ministry cited local residents as saying that several people were wounded during the incident that occurred early Wednesday. The claim could not be independently verified, and the Russian Foreign Ministry didn't comment on that.
Russia and Georgia fought a five-day war over South Ossetia and Abkhazia last year.
Russia recognized Georgia's breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent nations after the war. Nicaragua and Venezuela are the only nations that have followed suit. The U.S., the EU and the rest of the world consider them part of Georgia.
Posts tonen met het label Georgia. Alle posts tonen
Posts tonen met het label Georgia. Alle posts tonen
woensdag 11 november 2009
donderdag 16 april 2009
Russia needs more political competition
Russia needs stronger political competition and a greater freedom to protest, President Dmitry Medvedev said in remarks released Thursday, sending the strongest signal yet that he may rethink the legacy of predecessor Vladimir Putin.
Medvedev, who has positioned himself as a cautious liberal during his first year in power, has until now followed the path blazed by Putin, who methodically rolled back Russia's post-Soviet freedoms during his presidency.
Medvedev's statements at a meeting Wednesday with civil society activists contained some of his most explicit criticism of Putin's policies to date. The remarks were released on the Kremlin's Web site Thursday.
Medvedev specifically criticized the 2006 law that toughened registration and accounting rules for human rights groups and other non-governmental organizations, hampering their operations.
"A significant number of officials, which I think is quite dangerous, have got a sense that non-governmental organizations are enemies of the state which must be confronted to prevent some disease from seeping through and undermining the foundations of our order," Medvedev said.
Medvedev added that the purpose of the law was not to interfere with the operations of the groups. But his remarks contrasted sharply with statements from Putin who said tightened regulation was necessary to make sure that NGOs weren't controlled by what he called puppeteers from abroad.
The 2006 law requires organizations to file highly detailed reports about activities for the previous year, such as a precise accounting of all meetings held by NGO officials, and detailed information on how they are financed.
Passage of the law reflected the Kremlin's fears of what it saw as Western encouragement of anti-government protests in other ex-Soviet nations, including Georgia and Ukraine.
Medvedev said that NGOs face undue restrictions and added that changes in the law are "possible, and even essential."
He added that the country needs more freedom.
"There must a political competition, it's irreplaceable," he said.
Responding to rights activists' complaints about official refusals to sanction opposition protests, Medvedev agreed that authorities' actions defied the law.
"Authorities obviously don't want to sanction such actions, it's understandable," he said. "But in any case such decisions aren't based on law."
He agreed with one person at the conference, who suggested that Moscow needed its own Speaker's Corner, like the one in London's Hyde Park, and added that it should not be put in a distant location.
"It mustn't be an empty spot near garages or near some industrial zone," he said.
Moscow authorities have continuously rejected appeals from opposition groups to hold their rallies in central areas and offered alternative spots away from downtown.
Medvedev, who has positioned himself as a cautious liberal during his first year in power, has until now followed the path blazed by Putin, who methodically rolled back Russia's post-Soviet freedoms during his presidency.
Medvedev's statements at a meeting Wednesday with civil society activists contained some of his most explicit criticism of Putin's policies to date. The remarks were released on the Kremlin's Web site Thursday.
Medvedev specifically criticized the 2006 law that toughened registration and accounting rules for human rights groups and other non-governmental organizations, hampering their operations.
"A significant number of officials, which I think is quite dangerous, have got a sense that non-governmental organizations are enemies of the state which must be confronted to prevent some disease from seeping through and undermining the foundations of our order," Medvedev said.
Medvedev added that the purpose of the law was not to interfere with the operations of the groups. But his remarks contrasted sharply with statements from Putin who said tightened regulation was necessary to make sure that NGOs weren't controlled by what he called puppeteers from abroad.
The 2006 law requires organizations to file highly detailed reports about activities for the previous year, such as a precise accounting of all meetings held by NGO officials, and detailed information on how they are financed.
Passage of the law reflected the Kremlin's fears of what it saw as Western encouragement of anti-government protests in other ex-Soviet nations, including Georgia and Ukraine.
Medvedev said that NGOs face undue restrictions and added that changes in the law are "possible, and even essential."
He added that the country needs more freedom.
"There must a political competition, it's irreplaceable," he said.
Responding to rights activists' complaints about official refusals to sanction opposition protests, Medvedev agreed that authorities' actions defied the law.
"Authorities obviously don't want to sanction such actions, it's understandable," he said. "But in any case such decisions aren't based on law."
He agreed with one person at the conference, who suggested that Moscow needed its own Speaker's Corner, like the one in London's Hyde Park, and added that it should not be put in a distant location.
"It mustn't be an empty spot near garages or near some industrial zone," he said.
Moscow authorities have continuously rejected appeals from opposition groups to hold their rallies in central areas and offered alternative spots away from downtown.
maandag 9 februari 2009
Russia: to shoot journalists or to shoot human right activists
MOSCOW – The EU's top executive angered Prime Minister Vladimir Putin while standing next to him at a news conference on Friday by raising concerns about the murders of Russian human rights activists and journalists in Moscow.
Their acrimonious exchange came after meetings intended to improve European Union-Russian relations, badly scarred by the Georgia war and last month's cutoff of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe.
Both Putin and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said their talks were constructive and set a positive tone for negotiations on a long-awaited EU-Russia partnership agreement.
But the atmosphere soured after Barroso mentioned that he had raised the issue of Russia's problems with the rule of law in his meeting with President Dmitry Medvedev earlier Friday.
"I have just now learned that Mr. Barroso discussed the construction of a law-based state with President Medvedev," a visibly irritated Putin told reporters. "Mr. Barroso discussed this in the Kremlin but is talking about it here, at a news conference, where Mr. Medvedev is absent and cannot say anything about this issue."
Putin tried to turn the tables, saying the rights of ethnic Russians, migrants and prisoners are violated in some EU countries.
"We believe we must discuss the whole spectrum of problems, both in Russia and in the countries of the European Union," he said.
Barroso then tackled the matter in more detail, saying he had expressed EU concerns about the fatal shootings on a Moscow street last month of a human rights lawyer and a reporter — the latest killings of Russians who challenge the authorities.
"Human rights and the rule of law are things that are much more important than diplomacy between states," Barroso said in lengthy remarks. "They have to do directly with people, with the rights of citizens, and I think it's a very important element of our common European civilization."
That was too much for Putin.
"Are we going to continue this discussion?" he fumed.
The tension subsided somewhat, but Putin got the last word when he said, with more than a hint of sarcasm, that Russia would welcome frequent visits from "this Magnificent 10" — Barroso and the nine European commissioners he brought with him.
Russia and the EU are linked closely by commerce, but ties have been strained for years by disputes on issues ranging from timber tariffs to the Kremlin's record on human rights. Tensions were driven to a post-Cold War peak by Russia's war with Georgia in August, and the EU suspended talks with Russia on the new partnership deal.
The EU announced in October that it would resume negotiations on the agreement, but no visible progress was made. January's gas cutoff — which left European homes unheated and factories idle because of a price dispute between Russia and Ukraine — deepened EU concerns about its reliance on Russian energy supplies.
The EU gets about a quarter of the gas it uses from Russia.
"We need greater reliability and predictability from this relationship," Barroso told the news conference.
He said the gas drought showed that the new Russia-EU treaty "should enshrine robust rules on energy security."
Russia also wants guarantees against a repeat of the costly cutoff, which it blames on Ukraine, but has clashed with the EU over the format. Moscow has rejected EU pleas to join the Energy Charter, a treaty that would open up its rich gas fields to more foreign participation, and pushed for a new international compact.
"We need to think about forming a full-fledged international legal system to protect against such incidents because the current system — including the Energy Charter — doesn't work," Medvedev told Barroso in a telvised remark.
Both Barroso and Putin made soothing statements about the gas issue. But the argument over human rights underscored the deep tension between the two powers that warily share a continent.
Putin said Russia might be open to a revised Energy Charter, and Barroso said the EU would look at Russia's proposals. In another olive branch, he said that while the EU is seeking alternatives to Russian pipelines that dominate exports from the former Soviet Union, it does not oppose rival Russian pipeline projects.
Their acrimonious exchange came after meetings intended to improve European Union-Russian relations, badly scarred by the Georgia war and last month's cutoff of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe.
Both Putin and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said their talks were constructive and set a positive tone for negotiations on a long-awaited EU-Russia partnership agreement.
But the atmosphere soured after Barroso mentioned that he had raised the issue of Russia's problems with the rule of law in his meeting with President Dmitry Medvedev earlier Friday.
"I have just now learned that Mr. Barroso discussed the construction of a law-based state with President Medvedev," a visibly irritated Putin told reporters. "Mr. Barroso discussed this in the Kremlin but is talking about it here, at a news conference, where Mr. Medvedev is absent and cannot say anything about this issue."
Putin tried to turn the tables, saying the rights of ethnic Russians, migrants and prisoners are violated in some EU countries.
"We believe we must discuss the whole spectrum of problems, both in Russia and in the countries of the European Union," he said.
Barroso then tackled the matter in more detail, saying he had expressed EU concerns about the fatal shootings on a Moscow street last month of a human rights lawyer and a reporter — the latest killings of Russians who challenge the authorities.
"Human rights and the rule of law are things that are much more important than diplomacy between states," Barroso said in lengthy remarks. "They have to do directly with people, with the rights of citizens, and I think it's a very important element of our common European civilization."
That was too much for Putin.
"Are we going to continue this discussion?" he fumed.
The tension subsided somewhat, but Putin got the last word when he said, with more than a hint of sarcasm, that Russia would welcome frequent visits from "this Magnificent 10" — Barroso and the nine European commissioners he brought with him.
Russia and the EU are linked closely by commerce, but ties have been strained for years by disputes on issues ranging from timber tariffs to the Kremlin's record on human rights. Tensions were driven to a post-Cold War peak by Russia's war with Georgia in August, and the EU suspended talks with Russia on the new partnership deal.
The EU announced in October that it would resume negotiations on the agreement, but no visible progress was made. January's gas cutoff — which left European homes unheated and factories idle because of a price dispute between Russia and Ukraine — deepened EU concerns about its reliance on Russian energy supplies.
The EU gets about a quarter of the gas it uses from Russia.
"We need greater reliability and predictability from this relationship," Barroso told the news conference.
He said the gas drought showed that the new Russia-EU treaty "should enshrine robust rules on energy security."
Russia also wants guarantees against a repeat of the costly cutoff, which it blames on Ukraine, but has clashed with the EU over the format. Moscow has rejected EU pleas to join the Energy Charter, a treaty that would open up its rich gas fields to more foreign participation, and pushed for a new international compact.
"We need to think about forming a full-fledged international legal system to protect against such incidents because the current system — including the Energy Charter — doesn't work," Medvedev told Barroso in a telvised remark.
Both Barroso and Putin made soothing statements about the gas issue. But the argument over human rights underscored the deep tension between the two powers that warily share a continent.
Putin said Russia might be open to a revised Energy Charter, and Barroso said the EU would look at Russia's proposals. In another olive branch, he said that while the EU is seeking alternatives to Russian pipelines that dominate exports from the former Soviet Union, it does not oppose rival Russian pipeline projects.
dinsdag 11 november 2008
Melik Kaylan - Georgia, Russia and the new administration
We can ask the world to give Obama breathing space to get his thoughts in order before, as Joe Biden had it, other countries "test" him with all manner of impossible crises. Not as preposterous as it sounds, this notion of asking the world to hold off, considering Obama generates so much genuine goodwill abroad and, after all, his decisions will shape other countries' futures significantly.
Any countries found to be misbehaving prematurely will instantly get the dog-in-a-manger treatment, for with George Bush gone, whose fault could it be but their own? But no, the Taliban won't stay their barbarism an extra hour for popularity's sake.
Perhaps we can adjust our view of the world, instead, so crises just don't seem as imminent or morally exigent. The latter approach seems to be prevailing. Witness the recent sudden uptick in media noise about the Russia-Georgia conflict.
On Nov. 6, in a long expository article, The New York Times informed us that, according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Tbilisi had (a) initiated the hostilities and (b) done so with indiscriminate bombing of the South Ossetian capital without regard to civilian casualties--despite Georgian claims to the contrary. All sides consider the OSCE to be a highly dependable, impartial, monitoring body with long experience in the region.
On Nov. 8, the BBC Web site carried an oddly inchoate report that the OSCE had failed to warn member countries of the impending conflict. It quoted a senior OSCE official, who has since resigned, as saying he had "warned of Georgia's military activity before its move into the South Ossetia region" and his bosses failed to pass it on. His bosses deny his claims.
Whatever the BBC is pretending to report there, their subtext sneaks through loud and clear--Georgia invaded first. If Georgia invaded first, Russia was provoked, Russia could not but respond, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is a trigger-happy maniac, we should back off from confrontation with Moscow, this is no incipient or even full-fledged Cold War casus belli to test Obama, he can press the refresh button and the new world will pop up as a tabula rasa.
In the G.W. era this would fall under "faith-based" as opposed to "reality-based" reasoning. The Times and BBC can lay out their dream narrative all they want, but it's unlikely that Obama--as sober and intentional a politician as it's possible to wake up to with a hangover--will buy into it. Biden certainly won't.
Either way, they won't have a choice as Ex-President Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev ply their brutalist imperial course. Medvedev made his sentiments clear when he delivered his Moscow State of the Union speech sans any single reference to the U.S. election results. Meaning: Russia acts unilaterally no matter what happens elsewhere.
And Georgia? I have publicly defended Georgia's actions in this space, and others and I count Georgian President Saakashvili as a personal friend. Nothing has changed. Here's the real continuum of events, as I can best decipher them, that led to Aug. 7 and Aug. 8 when the hostilities escalated into full blown conflict.
First off, I cannot dispute the OSCE and the Times reports that the Georgian attack resulted in civilian casualties. I certainly never thought the Georgians carried out precise bombardments and I don't think they're capable of it. Neither are the Russkies.
I also believe the Georgians radically upped the confrontation--in effect, they attacked first. But they did so because they knew about the column of Russian tanks coming in through the Roki Tunnel that connects North and South Ossetia, that is, connects Russian territory to the breakaway region. A Russian invasion was in progress. The Times report addresses this glancingly toward the end:
"Neither Georgia nor its Western allies have as yet provided conclusive evidence that Russia was invading the country or that the situation for Georgians in the Ossetian zone was so dire that a large-scale military attack was necessary, as Mr. Saakashvili insists.
"Georgia has released telephone intercepts indicating that a Russian armored column apparently entered the enclave from Russia early on the Aug. 7, which would be a violation of the peacekeeping rules. Georgia said the column marked the beginning of an invasion. But the intercepts did not show the column's size, composition or mission, and there has not been evidence that it was engaged with Georgian forces until many hours after the Georgian bombardment; Russia insists it was simply a routine logistics train or troop rotation."
This is disingenuous. It makes no sense that the Russkies had some 200 fully armed, fueled tanks halfway into Georgia within two days, as a spontaneous and unplanned response to aggression. They're not that efficient. Both sides knew what was going down.
There is an argument that in shooting first, Saakashvili lost the moral propaganda advantage. It instantly looked like he had provoked a reaction. The other option was to let the Russkies invade and complain later from atop the moral high ground. He decided to fight first. He knew he wasn't going to win. The Russians owned the air. But worse, he knew that his allies were going to do nothing either way.
My bet is, he contacted the White House and they told him, as they'd done consistently up to then, that he was on his own. Think of the timing--Bush is in Beijing, the U.S. has an election coming, Saakashvili is abroad, everyone is on vacation--including all his allies. So the Georgians decide to attack South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali? No, I don't think so.
There is an additional misconception that underlies much of the programmatic left/right, Democrat/GOP, détente/Cold War binary thinking on the matter: that the Bush administration encouraged Saakashvili to confront the Russians or at least bolstered his sense of allied support.
This is manifestly untrue. Tbilisi insiders told me that Georgia had been asking the Bushies for anti-aircraft missiles for some years. The Bushies consistently refused. Georgia had managed to acquire some from Israel, but the supply abruptly stopped in early summer this year--nobody knows why but it's likely that the Russians had a conclusive word with Israel. The Russkies regularly overflew Georgian territory as constant provocation, dropping a stray bomb here and a missile there, by mistake, in open countryside.
Furthermore, the Bush administration had no practical measures in train for interceding Moscow's invasion. It wasn't until the scathing Wall Street Journal editorial of Aug. 12--"so far the administration has been missing in action"--that Washington was stung into taking practical measures. The White House even issued a press release specifically citing the Journal's editorial claims as inaccurate. But it followed the Journal's menu of suggestions precisely: send in Condi, supplies, boatlift and the like.
We probably have the Journal's editorial board to thank for Condi's hurried departure to Tbilisi at a time when Russian warplanes were still flying overhead--and with her arrival, perhaps even the halting of Russkie tanks short of Tbilisi.
The Georgians were always way down on the list of priorities for a fumble-prone White House. Saakashvili was never Washington's irreplaceable ally, at any rate never enough to keep the Russians at bay. Putin knew it. It may be a brave new post-Bush world, but he still knows it.
Any countries found to be misbehaving prematurely will instantly get the dog-in-a-manger treatment, for with George Bush gone, whose fault could it be but their own? But no, the Taliban won't stay their barbarism an extra hour for popularity's sake.
Perhaps we can adjust our view of the world, instead, so crises just don't seem as imminent or morally exigent. The latter approach seems to be prevailing. Witness the recent sudden uptick in media noise about the Russia-Georgia conflict.
On Nov. 6, in a long expository article, The New York Times informed us that, according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Tbilisi had (a) initiated the hostilities and (b) done so with indiscriminate bombing of the South Ossetian capital without regard to civilian casualties--despite Georgian claims to the contrary. All sides consider the OSCE to be a highly dependable, impartial, monitoring body with long experience in the region.
On Nov. 8, the BBC Web site carried an oddly inchoate report that the OSCE had failed to warn member countries of the impending conflict. It quoted a senior OSCE official, who has since resigned, as saying he had "warned of Georgia's military activity before its move into the South Ossetia region" and his bosses failed to pass it on. His bosses deny his claims.
Whatever the BBC is pretending to report there, their subtext sneaks through loud and clear--Georgia invaded first. If Georgia invaded first, Russia was provoked, Russia could not but respond, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is a trigger-happy maniac, we should back off from confrontation with Moscow, this is no incipient or even full-fledged Cold War casus belli to test Obama, he can press the refresh button and the new world will pop up as a tabula rasa.
In the G.W. era this would fall under "faith-based" as opposed to "reality-based" reasoning. The Times and BBC can lay out their dream narrative all they want, but it's unlikely that Obama--as sober and intentional a politician as it's possible to wake up to with a hangover--will buy into it. Biden certainly won't.
Either way, they won't have a choice as Ex-President Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev ply their brutalist imperial course. Medvedev made his sentiments clear when he delivered his Moscow State of the Union speech sans any single reference to the U.S. election results. Meaning: Russia acts unilaterally no matter what happens elsewhere.
And Georgia? I have publicly defended Georgia's actions in this space, and others and I count Georgian President Saakashvili as a personal friend. Nothing has changed. Here's the real continuum of events, as I can best decipher them, that led to Aug. 7 and Aug. 8 when the hostilities escalated into full blown conflict.
First off, I cannot dispute the OSCE and the Times reports that the Georgian attack resulted in civilian casualties. I certainly never thought the Georgians carried out precise bombardments and I don't think they're capable of it. Neither are the Russkies.
I also believe the Georgians radically upped the confrontation--in effect, they attacked first. But they did so because they knew about the column of Russian tanks coming in through the Roki Tunnel that connects North and South Ossetia, that is, connects Russian territory to the breakaway region. A Russian invasion was in progress. The Times report addresses this glancingly toward the end:
"Neither Georgia nor its Western allies have as yet provided conclusive evidence that Russia was invading the country or that the situation for Georgians in the Ossetian zone was so dire that a large-scale military attack was necessary, as Mr. Saakashvili insists.
"Georgia has released telephone intercepts indicating that a Russian armored column apparently entered the enclave from Russia early on the Aug. 7, which would be a violation of the peacekeeping rules. Georgia said the column marked the beginning of an invasion. But the intercepts did not show the column's size, composition or mission, and there has not been evidence that it was engaged with Georgian forces until many hours after the Georgian bombardment; Russia insists it was simply a routine logistics train or troop rotation."
This is disingenuous. It makes no sense that the Russkies had some 200 fully armed, fueled tanks halfway into Georgia within two days, as a spontaneous and unplanned response to aggression. They're not that efficient. Both sides knew what was going down.
There is an argument that in shooting first, Saakashvili lost the moral propaganda advantage. It instantly looked like he had provoked a reaction. The other option was to let the Russkies invade and complain later from atop the moral high ground. He decided to fight first. He knew he wasn't going to win. The Russians owned the air. But worse, he knew that his allies were going to do nothing either way.
My bet is, he contacted the White House and they told him, as they'd done consistently up to then, that he was on his own. Think of the timing--Bush is in Beijing, the U.S. has an election coming, Saakashvili is abroad, everyone is on vacation--including all his allies. So the Georgians decide to attack South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali? No, I don't think so.
There is an additional misconception that underlies much of the programmatic left/right, Democrat/GOP, détente/Cold War binary thinking on the matter: that the Bush administration encouraged Saakashvili to confront the Russians or at least bolstered his sense of allied support.
This is manifestly untrue. Tbilisi insiders told me that Georgia had been asking the Bushies for anti-aircraft missiles for some years. The Bushies consistently refused. Georgia had managed to acquire some from Israel, but the supply abruptly stopped in early summer this year--nobody knows why but it's likely that the Russians had a conclusive word with Israel. The Russkies regularly overflew Georgian territory as constant provocation, dropping a stray bomb here and a missile there, by mistake, in open countryside.
Furthermore, the Bush administration had no practical measures in train for interceding Moscow's invasion. It wasn't until the scathing Wall Street Journal editorial of Aug. 12--"so far the administration has been missing in action"--that Washington was stung into taking practical measures. The White House even issued a press release specifically citing the Journal's editorial claims as inaccurate. But it followed the Journal's menu of suggestions precisely: send in Condi, supplies, boatlift and the like.
We probably have the Journal's editorial board to thank for Condi's hurried departure to Tbilisi at a time when Russian warplanes were still flying overhead--and with her arrival, perhaps even the halting of Russkie tanks short of Tbilisi.
The Georgians were always way down on the list of priorities for a fumble-prone White House. Saakashvili was never Washington's irreplaceable ally, at any rate never enough to keep the Russians at bay. Putin knew it. It may be a brave new post-Bush world, but he still knows it.
The Death of the Dissident - Newsweek
By Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova
For centuries, a good majority of Russia's young and well-educated elite have looked westward for inspiration and role models—some of them revolutionary like Karl Marx, or more recently free marketers like Margaret Thatcher. Even during the years of Boris Yeltsin's chaotic reforms, most educated Russians still believed on some level that Russia's best hope for becoming a "normal" country was to follow the West's course of democracy and capitalism. A significant core of liberal democrats remained well into the eight-year rule of Vladimir Putin,and his relentless campaign to restore Russia's position as a great power.
But the August war in Georgia and the ongoing economic and financial collapse mark a tipping point. For the first time in generations, a mood of patriotism, jingoism and staunch Russian nationalism have become pervasive among even educated Russians who once considered themselves pro-Western liberals. Yes, most Russians have been reflexively patriotic all along. But Russia has seldom in living memory been more nationalistic—and seldom have Russia's brightest and best found themselves more in agreement with the people—as well as the Kremlin—on their country's greatness. In the spring of 2008, 65 percent of Russians felt "generally positive" about the United States, according to the Yuri Levada opinion polls center in Moscow. But after the war in Georgia, that indicator dropped to just 7 percent. At the same time, Putin's approval ratings have climbed eight points between July and September to 88 percent; Dmitry Medvedev's increased 13 points, to 83 percent.
The sharp increase underscores the "quick evolution of Russian empire complex," says Levada expert Natalya Zorkaya. "After the war the general feeling in society was, Hurrah! Russia, get up off your knees!" she says. Alexei Venediktov, editor-in-chief of Ekho Mozkvy, the last liberal national radio station still broadcasting opposition voices, says the patriotic mood has pervaded the elite to a remarkable degree. "I do not know a single Russian who would like to see his country dependent or weak—we all want Russia to be strong, wealthy and happy." Even the Union of Right Forces, once a radical free-market liberal party, last week split into pro- and anti-Kremlin factions, with the pro-Kremlin wing keeping the lion's share of the party members and offices.
The reasons for the change run deep. Rich or poor, a whole generation of Russians has gone from naive infatuation with the West's ideals in the 1990s to a deep disappointment and resentment fueled by perceived Western hypocrisy in ignoring Russian objections over the bombing of Serbia and the Iraq War—plus the widely held belief that Western economic advice during the 1990s was deliberately designed to weaken and dismember Russia. Now, for the first time in a generation, Russians have a short, victorious war to crow about, after defeats in Afghanistan and Chechyna. The financial crisis, even though it is hitting Russian markets hard, has given the Kremlin fodder for gloating that the West had finally received its comeuppance, and that finally, America will have to share the pedestal with other countries. "Putin inspired a kind of state-nationalism—he gave people hope that Russia can become a big player again," says Alexei Makarkin, vice-president of the Moscow-based Center for Political Technologies.
Among those who have turned: former Duma deputy Vyacheslav Igrunov, a founder of Memorial, a civic association devoted to the victims of Stalinism, as well as the liberal Yabloko Party. Jailed in the '80s for anti-Soviet activity, he was a classic dissident, a liberal and, in the jargon of the day, a "progressive intellectual." But like many of his fellow travelers, he experienced a disenchantment with the West, which crystallized, he says, after NATO supported Georgian "aggression" in Ossetia. Similarly, Sergei Markov, a one-time liberal dissident who "fought for freedom" in the 1980s by trying to overthrow communism and bring Russia's democrats to power, is now a Duma member for the Kremlin-created United Russia Party. He says the West "has lost all its authority for Russian intellectuals," by supporting Kosovo's independence but not Ossetia's, and because of the financial crisis, which undermines the Western free-market ideal. Now he advocates that "Russia should be preaching its own nationalistic and patriotic ideas in defense of the West's anti-Russian aggression," and the Kremlin has charged him with the task of organizing a series of initiatives to help, in Markov's words, "clean up the morals of the Russian elite" and create an ultrapatriotic breed of leaders who will help make Russia "a Christian, conservative European country, with genuine human and moral values."
Russia's leaders have done their utmost to promote a passionate nationalism. Putin promised this summer that the state would fund a new generation of patriotic films and television programs. News of this plan was rapturously received by an audience of academics and journalists at St. Petersburg State University. "The state should be taking a lead in forming the intellectual and spiritual life of Russians," says Alexander Zapesotsky, president of St. Petersburg's Trade Union Humanitarian University. The Kremlin has also continued to promote the ideologically motivated youth gangs it hatched in the aftermath of Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004. Their intent at the time had been to prevent the same kind of movement that had helped bring down Ukraine's government. Now these movements have spawned a network of ideologically correct organizations to organize—or, in their own terms, "modernize"—Russian business and society. The focus is on attracting young professionals and embryonic think tanks, which have proved effective in attracting ideas if only because of the promise of state funding for successful applicants. In July, Nashi leader Nikita Borovikov unveiled a plethora of new offshoots to Medvedev. Among them: "Nashi Builders," a group of young architects and designers who would brainstorm ideas for construction companies. Three years ago, management professor Vladimir Nechayev founded the Moscow Higher School of Management to train a new generation of Nashi leaders in universities across 45 regions of Russia. The core idea: "I value the success of my country as much or even more than my own success and ambitions." Some 50,000 students have since passed through its various courses—including a class of managers of the state-owned Russian Railways.
There are, of course, profound risks in the Kremlin's nationalistic tack. The NGO Sova, which monitors hate crimes, reports that 75 foreigners have been killed as a result of racist attacks and 291 wounded in Russia from January to September 2008, a steep increase over previous years. Medvedev's anti-U.S. rhetoric is dangerous too, largely because as the financial turmoil continues the temptation to shift blame onto a foreign enemy grows greater. Economic crises have historically led to ugly upsurges in nationalism—and the Kremlin is stoking the fire, a cynical ploy with sinister precedents, made all the more dangerous because there are now so few Russians left willing to oppose it.
For centuries, a good majority of Russia's young and well-educated elite have looked westward for inspiration and role models—some of them revolutionary like Karl Marx, or more recently free marketers like Margaret Thatcher. Even during the years of Boris Yeltsin's chaotic reforms, most educated Russians still believed on some level that Russia's best hope for becoming a "normal" country was to follow the West's course of democracy and capitalism. A significant core of liberal democrats remained well into the eight-year rule of Vladimir Putin,and his relentless campaign to restore Russia's position as a great power.
But the August war in Georgia and the ongoing economic and financial collapse mark a tipping point. For the first time in generations, a mood of patriotism, jingoism and staunch Russian nationalism have become pervasive among even educated Russians who once considered themselves pro-Western liberals. Yes, most Russians have been reflexively patriotic all along. But Russia has seldom in living memory been more nationalistic—and seldom have Russia's brightest and best found themselves more in agreement with the people—as well as the Kremlin—on their country's greatness. In the spring of 2008, 65 percent of Russians felt "generally positive" about the United States, according to the Yuri Levada opinion polls center in Moscow. But after the war in Georgia, that indicator dropped to just 7 percent. At the same time, Putin's approval ratings have climbed eight points between July and September to 88 percent; Dmitry Medvedev's increased 13 points, to 83 percent.
The sharp increase underscores the "quick evolution of Russian empire complex," says Levada expert Natalya Zorkaya. "After the war the general feeling in society was, Hurrah! Russia, get up off your knees!" she says. Alexei Venediktov, editor-in-chief of Ekho Mozkvy, the last liberal national radio station still broadcasting opposition voices, says the patriotic mood has pervaded the elite to a remarkable degree. "I do not know a single Russian who would like to see his country dependent or weak—we all want Russia to be strong, wealthy and happy." Even the Union of Right Forces, once a radical free-market liberal party, last week split into pro- and anti-Kremlin factions, with the pro-Kremlin wing keeping the lion's share of the party members and offices.
The reasons for the change run deep. Rich or poor, a whole generation of Russians has gone from naive infatuation with the West's ideals in the 1990s to a deep disappointment and resentment fueled by perceived Western hypocrisy in ignoring Russian objections over the bombing of Serbia and the Iraq War—plus the widely held belief that Western economic advice during the 1990s was deliberately designed to weaken and dismember Russia. Now, for the first time in a generation, Russians have a short, victorious war to crow about, after defeats in Afghanistan and Chechyna. The financial crisis, even though it is hitting Russian markets hard, has given the Kremlin fodder for gloating that the West had finally received its comeuppance, and that finally, America will have to share the pedestal with other countries. "Putin inspired a kind of state-nationalism—he gave people hope that Russia can become a big player again," says Alexei Makarkin, vice-president of the Moscow-based Center for Political Technologies.
Among those who have turned: former Duma deputy Vyacheslav Igrunov, a founder of Memorial, a civic association devoted to the victims of Stalinism, as well as the liberal Yabloko Party. Jailed in the '80s for anti-Soviet activity, he was a classic dissident, a liberal and, in the jargon of the day, a "progressive intellectual." But like many of his fellow travelers, he experienced a disenchantment with the West, which crystallized, he says, after NATO supported Georgian "aggression" in Ossetia. Similarly, Sergei Markov, a one-time liberal dissident who "fought for freedom" in the 1980s by trying to overthrow communism and bring Russia's democrats to power, is now a Duma member for the Kremlin-created United Russia Party. He says the West "has lost all its authority for Russian intellectuals," by supporting Kosovo's independence but not Ossetia's, and because of the financial crisis, which undermines the Western free-market ideal. Now he advocates that "Russia should be preaching its own nationalistic and patriotic ideas in defense of the West's anti-Russian aggression," and the Kremlin has charged him with the task of organizing a series of initiatives to help, in Markov's words, "clean up the morals of the Russian elite" and create an ultrapatriotic breed of leaders who will help make Russia "a Christian, conservative European country, with genuine human and moral values."
Russia's leaders have done their utmost to promote a passionate nationalism. Putin promised this summer that the state would fund a new generation of patriotic films and television programs. News of this plan was rapturously received by an audience of academics and journalists at St. Petersburg State University. "The state should be taking a lead in forming the intellectual and spiritual life of Russians," says Alexander Zapesotsky, president of St. Petersburg's Trade Union Humanitarian University. The Kremlin has also continued to promote the ideologically motivated youth gangs it hatched in the aftermath of Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004. Their intent at the time had been to prevent the same kind of movement that had helped bring down Ukraine's government. Now these movements have spawned a network of ideologically correct organizations to organize—or, in their own terms, "modernize"—Russian business and society. The focus is on attracting young professionals and embryonic think tanks, which have proved effective in attracting ideas if only because of the promise of state funding for successful applicants. In July, Nashi leader Nikita Borovikov unveiled a plethora of new offshoots to Medvedev. Among them: "Nashi Builders," a group of young architects and designers who would brainstorm ideas for construction companies. Three years ago, management professor Vladimir Nechayev founded the Moscow Higher School of Management to train a new generation of Nashi leaders in universities across 45 regions of Russia. The core idea: "I value the success of my country as much or even more than my own success and ambitions." Some 50,000 students have since passed through its various courses—including a class of managers of the state-owned Russian Railways.
There are, of course, profound risks in the Kremlin's nationalistic tack. The NGO Sova, which monitors hate crimes, reports that 75 foreigners have been killed as a result of racist attacks and 291 wounded in Russia from January to September 2008, a steep increase over previous years. Medvedev's anti-U.S. rhetoric is dangerous too, largely because as the financial turmoil continues the temptation to shift blame onto a foreign enemy grows greater. Economic crises have historically led to ugly upsurges in nationalism—and the Kremlin is stoking the fire, a cynical ploy with sinister precedents, made all the more dangerous because there are now so few Russians left willing to oppose it.
zondag 9 november 2008
France vs Russia
In a move which was partly an audacious bluff and partly a complex legalistic gambit, the French president faced down determined opposition from Lithuania and Poland to open the door to normalizing the EU-Russia relationship three months after the Georgian conflict.
The European Union's French presidency has said the bloc is in a position to relaunch Partnership and Cooperation Treaty talks with Moscow that were broken off in the wake of the war between Russia and Georgia.
The announcement by French President Nicolas Sarkozy that Russia has complied with EU demands in Georgia stunned some Eastern European leaders who were in Brussels for an EU crisis summit on the global economy.
The talks are now all but certain to resume on November 14 when the EU and Russia meet for a summit in the French city of Nice.
Eastern European Opposition
In a move which was partly an audacious bluff and partly a complex legalistic gambit, the French president faced down determined opposition from Lithuania and Poland to open the door to normalizing the EU-Russia relationship three months after the Georgian conflict.
Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus had arrived at the summit threatening to veto any such move. In an article published on November 6 in the Brussels weekly, "European Voice," he said it would be a "disaster" to act before Russian forces had quit all of Georgian territory.
Adamkus had the public backing of Polish President Lech Kaczynski, and the sympathy of a number of other leaders.
Addressing a post-summit news conference on November 7, Sarkozy effectively said Adamkus and his supporters misunderstand what they had agreed to on September 1, when an emergency EU summit broke off talks.
"Let me remind you that these negotiations were never suspended -- because [the EU] points the way here -- because if there had been a suspension, there would have had to be a summit decision," Sarkozy said. "Together with [European Commission] President [Jose Manuel] Barroso, we simply postponed the date."
However, the EU said in a summit statement on September 1 that "till troops have withdrawn to the positions held prior to August 7, meetings on the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement [with Russia] will be postponed."
As it turns out, "postponement" can be read to mean that EU member states never withdrew their prior underlying consent for the negotiations, leaving it up to the bloc's executive -- the presidency and the European Commission -- to proceed as it sees fit.
Any decision as momentous as this one requires some justification, however. Recognizing this, Sarkozy on November 7 resorted to a fudge -- or something which unkind observers might be inclined to see as an act of diplomatic vandalism.
He said Russia had met all the commitments it had undertaken under EU mediation with respect to Georgia: they implemented a ceasefire, allowed EU observers to deploy, and launched international talks on the future of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russian Withdrawal
But, most controversially, Sarkozy also said Russia has fully complied with the requirement to withdraw its forces to pre-conflict positions, as required by the EU-mediated accords of August 12 and September 8.
"The second commitment -- the retreat of Russian forces to pre-conflict borders before the crisis on August 8. Has this been fulfilled? Yes," Sarkozy said.
Everything hinges on Sarkozy's substitution of the word "borders" for the original -- and correct -- term, "lines." According to Sarkozy's interpretation, Russia was never obliged to remove any troops from the separatist regions.
Georgian claims to areas held by its forces before the conflict within Abkhazia and South Ossetia are thus also without merit.
The impression that Sarkozy's remarks -- appearing as they did as an afterthought in the margins of a summit devoted to an entirely different subject -- are part of a carefully crafted master plan is borne out by reports that behind closed doors, the French leader placated his opponents with a different view.
One official present at the meeting said Sarkozy had assured his EU colleagues he would express the bloc's dissatisfaction with Moscow's insufficient compliance with the bloc's terms when the two sides meet in Nice on November 14.
The French diplomatic offensive was assisted by European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, who said he had warned the Lithuanian and Polish leaders that, if prevented from acting in concert, individual member states would start striking separate deals with Moscow.
Aiming his news conference remarks directly at Warsaw and Vilnius, Barroso said, "You may not like the common EU position entirely, but it is in your own interest to have one rather than three or four different positions."
Both Barroso and Sarkozy represent a school of thought within the EU which holds that keeping lines of communication open with Moscow is crucial for the bloc's broader interests, which range from securing energy provisions to cooperation with Russia in the UN Security Council on issues such as Iran.
Conceding defeat, Lithuania's and Poland's backers in the EU said they would now set their sights on the November 10 meeting of the foreign ministers in a bid to secure a joint statement which makes clear that although the partnership talks will continue, Moscow has not fully met EU conditions.
Fearing intractable divisions, France is resisting the adoption of any EU statement at the meeting.
Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip told RFE/RL that he and like-minded leaders within the EU will also strive to get the bloc to acknowledge that pragmatic cooperation, not a fully fledged partnership, is the most it can hold out for Russia.
"We can talk about cooperation with any country in the world. In Russia's case, we're not in a position now, considering its military attack on a sovereign neighbor, to talk about a partnership or the sharing of common values," Ansip said.
Adamkus emerged from the summit insisting that there could be no talk of renewed partnership talks with Russia before it has withdrawn its troops from all of Georgian territory, but he did not elaborate.
The European Union's French presidency has said the bloc is in a position to relaunch Partnership and Cooperation Treaty talks with Moscow that were broken off in the wake of the war between Russia and Georgia.
The announcement by French President Nicolas Sarkozy that Russia has complied with EU demands in Georgia stunned some Eastern European leaders who were in Brussels for an EU crisis summit on the global economy.
The talks are now all but certain to resume on November 14 when the EU and Russia meet for a summit in the French city of Nice.
Eastern European Opposition
In a move which was partly an audacious bluff and partly a complex legalistic gambit, the French president faced down determined opposition from Lithuania and Poland to open the door to normalizing the EU-Russia relationship three months after the Georgian conflict.
Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus had arrived at the summit threatening to veto any such move. In an article published on November 6 in the Brussels weekly, "European Voice," he said it would be a "disaster" to act before Russian forces had quit all of Georgian territory.
Adamkus had the public backing of Polish President Lech Kaczynski, and the sympathy of a number of other leaders.
Addressing a post-summit news conference on November 7, Sarkozy effectively said Adamkus and his supporters misunderstand what they had agreed to on September 1, when an emergency EU summit broke off talks.
"Let me remind you that these negotiations were never suspended -- because [the EU] points the way here -- because if there had been a suspension, there would have had to be a summit decision," Sarkozy said. "Together with [European Commission] President [Jose Manuel] Barroso, we simply postponed the date."
However, the EU said in a summit statement on September 1 that "till troops have withdrawn to the positions held prior to August 7, meetings on the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement [with Russia] will be postponed."
As it turns out, "postponement" can be read to mean that EU member states never withdrew their prior underlying consent for the negotiations, leaving it up to the bloc's executive -- the presidency and the European Commission -- to proceed as it sees fit.
Any decision as momentous as this one requires some justification, however. Recognizing this, Sarkozy on November 7 resorted to a fudge -- or something which unkind observers might be inclined to see as an act of diplomatic vandalism.
He said Russia had met all the commitments it had undertaken under EU mediation with respect to Georgia: they implemented a ceasefire, allowed EU observers to deploy, and launched international talks on the future of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russian Withdrawal
But, most controversially, Sarkozy also said Russia has fully complied with the requirement to withdraw its forces to pre-conflict positions, as required by the EU-mediated accords of August 12 and September 8.
"The second commitment -- the retreat of Russian forces to pre-conflict borders before the crisis on August 8. Has this been fulfilled? Yes," Sarkozy said.
Everything hinges on Sarkozy's substitution of the word "borders" for the original -- and correct -- term, "lines." According to Sarkozy's interpretation, Russia was never obliged to remove any troops from the separatist regions.
Georgian claims to areas held by its forces before the conflict within Abkhazia and South Ossetia are thus also without merit.
The impression that Sarkozy's remarks -- appearing as they did as an afterthought in the margins of a summit devoted to an entirely different subject -- are part of a carefully crafted master plan is borne out by reports that behind closed doors, the French leader placated his opponents with a different view.
One official present at the meeting said Sarkozy had assured his EU colleagues he would express the bloc's dissatisfaction with Moscow's insufficient compliance with the bloc's terms when the two sides meet in Nice on November 14.
The French diplomatic offensive was assisted by European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, who said he had warned the Lithuanian and Polish leaders that, if prevented from acting in concert, individual member states would start striking separate deals with Moscow.
Aiming his news conference remarks directly at Warsaw and Vilnius, Barroso said, "You may not like the common EU position entirely, but it is in your own interest to have one rather than three or four different positions."
Both Barroso and Sarkozy represent a school of thought within the EU which holds that keeping lines of communication open with Moscow is crucial for the bloc's broader interests, which range from securing energy provisions to cooperation with Russia in the UN Security Council on issues such as Iran.
Conceding defeat, Lithuania's and Poland's backers in the EU said they would now set their sights on the November 10 meeting of the foreign ministers in a bid to secure a joint statement which makes clear that although the partnership talks will continue, Moscow has not fully met EU conditions.
Fearing intractable divisions, France is resisting the adoption of any EU statement at the meeting.
Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip told RFE/RL that he and like-minded leaders within the EU will also strive to get the bloc to acknowledge that pragmatic cooperation, not a fully fledged partnership, is the most it can hold out for Russia.
"We can talk about cooperation with any country in the world. In Russia's case, we're not in a position now, considering its military attack on a sovereign neighbor, to talk about a partnership or the sharing of common values," Ansip said.
Adamkus emerged from the summit insisting that there could be no talk of renewed partnership talks with Russia before it has withdrawn its troops from all of Georgian territory, but he did not elaborate.
zaterdag 18 oktober 2008
Who is Zaza Miminoshvili?
Who is Zaza Miminoshvili? Zaza Miminoshvili is a guitar player who organises a benefit performance on the 19/20/21th of October for those Georgians who fell victim to the Russian agression starting the 7th of August.
For every ticket being sold, 8 euro goes to children from Gori and Tschikinvali who are now getting shelter in Tbilisi.
Miminoshvili made it during a recent interview in die Zeit clear that the benefit performance is meant to help all the reguees: from South Ossetia, Abchazia and Georgia proper.
For all my German readers (who must be with thousands :-), go and see him:
19th October Berlin, Kulturbrauerei: 20.00
20th October Hamburg, Fabrik: 20.00
21th October Bremen, Moments: 20.00
For every ticket being sold, 8 euro goes to children from Gori and Tschikinvali who are now getting shelter in Tbilisi.
Miminoshvili made it during a recent interview in die Zeit clear that the benefit performance is meant to help all the reguees: from South Ossetia, Abchazia and Georgia proper.
For all my German readers (who must be with thousands :-), go and see him:
19th October Berlin, Kulturbrauerei: 20.00
20th October Hamburg, Fabrik: 20.00
21th October Bremen, Moments: 20.00
vrijdag 17 oktober 2008
Russia and Europe too soon to kiss and make up
Russia and Europe too soon to kiss and make up
Summary: The European Union should not give Russia a new partnership deal until it genuinely withdraws from Georgia.
RUSSIA announced this week that, just as it promised, it had pulled all its troops in Georgia back to the two disputed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Many European Union leaders were swift to praise the Kremlin for meeting the conditions it agreed with France’s Nicolas Sarkozy some six weeks ago—and almost as quick to suggest a return to business as usual.
A majority now want to start talks in November on a new “partnership and co-operation agreement”. Their none-so-subtle message is: forget about the pesky Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, who was anyway responsible for starting the war on August 7th, and attend instead to the more urgent task of repairing relations with our biggest energy supplier.
The West needs to keep talking to Russia about many things, notably efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and further reductions in Russia’s and America’s own nuclear arsenals.
Yet it would be wrong to heed calls from the likes of Germany, Italy and their allies to start talks now on a new partnership agreement, as if the Georgian war had never happened. The main reason for this is that the troop withdrawal is largely bogus.
The Russians have stationed almost 8,000 troops in the two enclaves.
Villages in South Ossetia and beyond have been brutally cleansed of their Georgian inhabitants. And Abkhaz forces have retaken the Kodori Gorge, previously controlled by the Georgians. This does not come close to a pull-back to pre-August 7th positions, which is what the EU originally stipulated before embarking on a new partnership agreement. Moreover, the Russians still refuse to allow any of the 200-odd ceasefire monitors deployed by the EU into the two disputed territories.
Some regard Georgia and the Caucasus as small, faraway and so unimportant. They are, on the contrary, a strategically vital region that could play a critical role in the EU’s future energy security. And, as Mr Saakashvili has often said, if the Russians think they can escape unpunished for the invasion and occupation of parts of his country, that could embolden further adventurism. The war was popular with ordinary Russians: the popularity of President Dmitry Medvedev and the prime minister, Vladimir Putin, has risen even as financial markets have tanked. There are plenty of Russian citizens and passport-holders in such neighbours as Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics whom the Kremlin might easily find a sudden need to “protect”, just as it did in South Ossetia.
Besides, this is not just about the Caucasus. Both Mr Medvedev and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, have muttered belligerent things about Russia’s neighbours and the West in general. Its short war with Georgia seems to have confirmed Russia’s prejudice that it can cow its neighbours—including some members of the EU—by threatening or even using force. The Russians continue to treat the supply of energy as another weapon in their armoury. There can be no genuine partnership with the EU while Russia thinks this way.
Neighbourhood watch
The EU should be urgently seeking to put more substance into the neighbourhood policy that defines its dealings with Russia’s near-abroad. For all his annoying arrogance, Mr Saakashvili is a democratically elected president who has liberalised Georgia’s economy and cracked down on corruption. Ukraine’s democracy may sometimes resemble a tragicomedy (it is currently preparing for its third parliamentary election in the space of three years), but it is vigorous for all that. Even the autocratic Armenia and Azerbaijan may now look more to the West than they did before the war in Georgia. Belarus, widely known as Europe’s last dictatorship, is shifting its ground a little—as the EU recognised this week when it decided to relax its visa ban on the country’s leaders.
The EU could help these countries by offering financial aid, more open trade deals and easier visa conditions. It should also hold out to them prospect of eventual membership. This is less provocative than the notion of letting any of them into NATO, which has surely receded into the future after the Georgian war. But as experience in the Balkans has shown, the lure of eventual EU membership is a good way to foster liberal, market-based democracy and to defuse territorial and ethnic disputes. As for Russia, its help is still needed on some vital global issues. But for the EU to go ahead with new “partnership” talks now would send a message of astounding pusillanimity. At the very least, Russia needs first to live up to its promises to withdraw properly from Georgia and to let the EU’s monitors into the disputed enclaves.
Summary: The European Union should not give Russia a new partnership deal until it genuinely withdraws from Georgia.
RUSSIA announced this week that, just as it promised, it had pulled all its troops in Georgia back to the two disputed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Many European Union leaders were swift to praise the Kremlin for meeting the conditions it agreed with France’s Nicolas Sarkozy some six weeks ago—and almost as quick to suggest a return to business as usual.
A majority now want to start talks in November on a new “partnership and co-operation agreement”. Their none-so-subtle message is: forget about the pesky Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, who was anyway responsible for starting the war on August 7th, and attend instead to the more urgent task of repairing relations with our biggest energy supplier.
The West needs to keep talking to Russia about many things, notably efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and further reductions in Russia’s and America’s own nuclear arsenals.
Yet it would be wrong to heed calls from the likes of Germany, Italy and their allies to start talks now on a new partnership agreement, as if the Georgian war had never happened. The main reason for this is that the troop withdrawal is largely bogus.
The Russians have stationed almost 8,000 troops in the two enclaves.
Villages in South Ossetia and beyond have been brutally cleansed of their Georgian inhabitants. And Abkhaz forces have retaken the Kodori Gorge, previously controlled by the Georgians. This does not come close to a pull-back to pre-August 7th positions, which is what the EU originally stipulated before embarking on a new partnership agreement. Moreover, the Russians still refuse to allow any of the 200-odd ceasefire monitors deployed by the EU into the two disputed territories.
Some regard Georgia and the Caucasus as small, faraway and so unimportant. They are, on the contrary, a strategically vital region that could play a critical role in the EU’s future energy security. And, as Mr Saakashvili has often said, if the Russians think they can escape unpunished for the invasion and occupation of parts of his country, that could embolden further adventurism. The war was popular with ordinary Russians: the popularity of President Dmitry Medvedev and the prime minister, Vladimir Putin, has risen even as financial markets have tanked. There are plenty of Russian citizens and passport-holders in such neighbours as Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics whom the Kremlin might easily find a sudden need to “protect”, just as it did in South Ossetia.
Besides, this is not just about the Caucasus. Both Mr Medvedev and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, have muttered belligerent things about Russia’s neighbours and the West in general. Its short war with Georgia seems to have confirmed Russia’s prejudice that it can cow its neighbours—including some members of the EU—by threatening or even using force. The Russians continue to treat the supply of energy as another weapon in their armoury. There can be no genuine partnership with the EU while Russia thinks this way.
Neighbourhood watch
The EU should be urgently seeking to put more substance into the neighbourhood policy that defines its dealings with Russia’s near-abroad. For all his annoying arrogance, Mr Saakashvili is a democratically elected president who has liberalised Georgia’s economy and cracked down on corruption. Ukraine’s democracy may sometimes resemble a tragicomedy (it is currently preparing for its third parliamentary election in the space of three years), but it is vigorous for all that. Even the autocratic Armenia and Azerbaijan may now look more to the West than they did before the war in Georgia. Belarus, widely known as Europe’s last dictatorship, is shifting its ground a little—as the EU recognised this week when it decided to relax its visa ban on the country’s leaders.
The EU could help these countries by offering financial aid, more open trade deals and easier visa conditions. It should also hold out to them prospect of eventual membership. This is less provocative than the notion of letting any of them into NATO, which has surely receded into the future after the Georgian war. But as experience in the Balkans has shown, the lure of eventual EU membership is a good way to foster liberal, market-based democracy and to defuse territorial and ethnic disputes. As for Russia, its help is still needed on some vital global issues. But for the EU to go ahead with new “partnership” talks now would send a message of astounding pusillanimity. At the very least, Russia needs first to live up to its promises to withdraw properly from Georgia and to let the EU’s monitors into the disputed enclaves.
vrijdag 10 oktober 2008
Ethnic cleansing in ethnic Georgian villages
LONDON (AP) — Russia and Georgia could be suspended from Europe's top human rights body unless the two countries uphold their obligations to prevent abuses in the aftermath of their short but fierce war, the group's head said Monday.
Terry Davis, secretary-general of the Council of Europe, told The Associated Press that both countries breached their obligations when they went to war in August over the breakaway Georgian province of South Ossetia.
Davis did not go into detail but the council's parliamentary assembly last week expressed concern over what it called "credible reports of acts of ethnic cleansing committed in ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia."
Davis said the parliamentary assembly made clear "we're not prepared to have business as usual."
He said that unless the rights situation in Georgia improved both their memberships in the 47-nation grouping could be in jeopardy.
"If there is no improvement in the situation, if we are not satisfied that Georgia and Russia are now fulfilling their obligations, then we will have to consider what action to take," Davis said at the sidelines of a legal conference hosted by the Council of Europe in London.
"That action could be — could be — suspension of a member country from the council," he said.
Davis said he wanted the council to publish a report on Russia-Georgia conflict within the next month that evaluates both sides on a range of human rights issues.
The council has never suspended a country before. However Russia's voting rights in the council's assembly were revoked eight years ago over rights violations in Chechnya. The voting rights were restored a year later.
The Council of Europe was set up after World War II to promote cooperation and human rights. Its parliamentary arm meets several times a year to debate democracy and rights issues.
Members include nearly every country in wes
Terry Davis, secretary-general of the Council of Europe, told The Associated Press that both countries breached their obligations when they went to war in August over the breakaway Georgian province of South Ossetia.
Davis did not go into detail but the council's parliamentary assembly last week expressed concern over what it called "credible reports of acts of ethnic cleansing committed in ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia."
Davis said the parliamentary assembly made clear "we're not prepared to have business as usual."
He said that unless the rights situation in Georgia improved both their memberships in the 47-nation grouping could be in jeopardy.
"If there is no improvement in the situation, if we are not satisfied that Georgia and Russia are now fulfilling their obligations, then we will have to consider what action to take," Davis said at the sidelines of a legal conference hosted by the Council of Europe in London.
"That action could be — could be — suspension of a member country from the council," he said.
Davis said he wanted the council to publish a report on Russia-Georgia conflict within the next month that evaluates both sides on a range of human rights issues.
The council has never suspended a country before. However Russia's voting rights in the council's assembly were revoked eight years ago over rights violations in Chechnya. The voting rights were restored a year later.
The Council of Europe was set up after World War II to promote cooperation and human rights. Its parliamentary arm meets several times a year to debate democracy and rights issues.
Members include nearly every country in wes
donderdag 9 oktober 2008
Don't be fooled by Russia
Europe shouldn't give Russia too much credit for pulling troops out of Georgian buffer zones. The move doesn't go far enough in proving that Moscow wants to be a true European partner, writes Ingo Mannteufel (deutsche Welle).
Ahead of his meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Evian, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proudly announced that Russia -- as promised -- will pull its troops out of the Georgian buffer zone ahead of the deadline. The move is an attempt by Russia to show itself as a stable and constructive partner for the European Union and to make up for a loss of trust that has emerged over the past few months.
President Medvedev is able to present himself as relaxed and in control since Russia doesn't really lose much by withdrawing its troops from the buffer zone. The move doesn't play a role at all when regarded from the military's strategic point of view. The Russian army will continue to secure the Abkhaz and South Ossetian regions with 7,600 troops set to remain there for the long-term.
From a diplomatic-political standpoint, Russia also hasn't given an inch of ground with the troops' withdrawal. The principle of Georgia's territorial integrity continues to be held in disdain by Moscow's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence.
No change in Russian policy
The pullout of soldiers from the buffer zone ahead of the agreed deadline should be seen as an expression of Russia's current strategy. Russia has achieved the preliminary goals it set for the conflict by militarily securing the breakaway provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia and diplomatically recognizing them. Now Moscow is hoping to achieve even more by showing itself to be a constructive partner for the European Union.
But the fundamental problem remains. Russia took advantage of Georgia's aggression against the separatist regime in South Ossetia to recognize the independence of pro-Russian regions. By doing so, Moscow, for the first time since the breakup of the Soviet Union 17 years ago, violated the legal sanctity of international borders of territories that used to belong to the USSR.
This is not only a threatening situation for Georgia that won't please President Mikhail Saakashvili, it is also a dangerous development for the Eurasian continent.
These developments make a Caucasus stability package, which will hopefully be negotiated in Geneva next week by representatives from Russia, the EU and other involved parties -- including South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Georgia, absolutely essential. This is the only way to achieve lasting peace in the region. The European Union should makes its Russia policy dependent on constructive participation from Moscow during these talks -- not on the withdrawal of Russian soldiers from a buffer zone they created for themselves.
Ahead of his meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Evian, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proudly announced that Russia -- as promised -- will pull its troops out of the Georgian buffer zone ahead of the deadline. The move is an attempt by Russia to show itself as a stable and constructive partner for the European Union and to make up for a loss of trust that has emerged over the past few months.
President Medvedev is able to present himself as relaxed and in control since Russia doesn't really lose much by withdrawing its troops from the buffer zone. The move doesn't play a role at all when regarded from the military's strategic point of view. The Russian army will continue to secure the Abkhaz and South Ossetian regions with 7,600 troops set to remain there for the long-term.
From a diplomatic-political standpoint, Russia also hasn't given an inch of ground with the troops' withdrawal. The principle of Georgia's territorial integrity continues to be held in disdain by Moscow's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence.
No change in Russian policy
The pullout of soldiers from the buffer zone ahead of the agreed deadline should be seen as an expression of Russia's current strategy. Russia has achieved the preliminary goals it set for the conflict by militarily securing the breakaway provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia and diplomatically recognizing them. Now Moscow is hoping to achieve even more by showing itself to be a constructive partner for the European Union.
But the fundamental problem remains. Russia took advantage of Georgia's aggression against the separatist regime in South Ossetia to recognize the independence of pro-Russian regions. By doing so, Moscow, for the first time since the breakup of the Soviet Union 17 years ago, violated the legal sanctity of international borders of territories that used to belong to the USSR.
This is not only a threatening situation for Georgia that won't please President Mikhail Saakashvili, it is also a dangerous development for the Eurasian continent.
These developments make a Caucasus stability package, which will hopefully be negotiated in Geneva next week by representatives from Russia, the EU and other involved parties -- including South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Georgia, absolutely essential. This is the only way to achieve lasting peace in the region. The European Union should makes its Russia policy dependent on constructive participation from Moscow during these talks -- not on the withdrawal of Russian soldiers from a buffer zone they created for themselves.
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