Russia and Europe too soon to kiss and make up

Russia and Europe too soon to kiss and make up

Summary: The European Union should not give Russia a new partnership deal until it genuinely withdraws from Georgia.

RUSSIA announced this week that, just as it promised, it had pulled all its troops in Georgia back to the two disputed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Many European Union leaders were swift to praise the Kremlin for meeting the conditions it agreed with France’s Nicolas Sarkozy some six weeks ago—and almost as quick to suggest a return to business as usual.

A majority now want to start talks in November on a new “partnership and co-operation agreement”. Their none-so-subtle message is: forget about the pesky Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, who was anyway responsible for starting the war on August 7th, and attend instead to the more urgent task of repairing relations with our biggest energy supplier.

The West needs to keep talking to Russia about many things, notably efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and further reductions in Russia’s and America’s own nuclear arsenals.

Yet it would be wrong to heed calls from the likes of Germany, Italy and their allies to start talks now on a new partnership agreement, as if the Georgian war had never happened. The main reason for this is that the troop withdrawal is largely bogus.

The Russians have stationed almost 8,000 troops in the two enclaves.

Villages in South Ossetia and beyond have been brutally cleansed of their Georgian inhabitants. And Abkhaz forces have retaken the Kodori Gorge, previously controlled by the Georgians. This does not come close to a pull-back to pre-August 7th positions, which is what the EU originally stipulated before embarking on a new partnership agreement. Moreover, the Russians still refuse to allow any of the 200-odd ceasefire monitors deployed by the EU into the two disputed territories.


Some regard Georgia and the Caucasus as small, faraway and so unimportant. They are, on the contrary, a strategically vital region that could play a critical role in the EU’s future energy security. And, as Mr Saakashvili has often said, if the Russians think they can escape unpunished for the invasion and occupation of parts of his country, that could embolden further adventurism. The war was popular with ordinary Russians: the popularity of President Dmitry Medvedev and the prime minister, Vladimir Putin, has risen even as financial markets have tanked. There are plenty of Russian citizens and passport-holders in such neighbours as Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics whom the Kremlin might easily find a sudden need to “protect”, just as it did in South Ossetia.

Besides, this is not just about the Caucasus. Both Mr Medvedev and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, have muttered belligerent things about Russia’s neighbours and the West in general. Its short war with Georgia seems to have confirmed Russia’s prejudice that it can cow its neighbours—including some members of the EU—by threatening or even using force. The Russians continue to treat the supply of energy as another weapon in their armoury. There can be no genuine partnership with the EU while Russia thinks this way.
Neighbourhood watch

The EU should be urgently seeking to put more substance into the neighbourhood policy that defines its dealings with Russia’s near-abroad. For all his annoying arrogance, Mr Saakashvili is a democratically elected president who has liberalised Georgia’s economy and cracked down on corruption. Ukraine’s democracy may sometimes resemble a tragicomedy (it is currently preparing for its third parliamentary election in the space of three years), but it is vigorous for all that. Even the autocratic Armenia and Azerbaijan may now look more to the West than they did before the war in Georgia. Belarus, widely known as Europe’s last dictatorship, is shifting its ground a little—as the EU recognised this week when it decided to relax its visa ban on the country’s leaders.

The EU could help these countries by offering financial aid, more open trade deals and easier visa conditions. It should also hold out to them prospect of eventual membership. This is less provocative than the notion of letting any of them into NATO, which has surely receded into the future after the Georgian war. But as experience in the Balkans has shown, the lure of eventual EU membership is a good way to foster liberal, market-based democracy and to defuse territorial and ethnic disputes. As for Russia, its help is still needed on some vital global issues. But for the EU to go ahead with new “partnership” talks now would send a message of astounding pusillanimity. At the very least, Russia needs first to live up to its promises to withdraw properly from Georgia and to let the EU’s monitors into the disputed enclaves.