To the extent that he focused on Russia at all, Barack Obama’s attention was concentrated primarily on the need to keep Soviet nuclear weapons stockpiles out of the hands of terrorists.
But now, President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia has thrown down a gauntlet intended to demonstrate to the American president-elect that the post-cold war era may not be so post after all.
On Wednesday, while leaders around the world were falling over themselves to hail Mr. Obama’s election, Mr. Medvedev delivered a harsh welcome-to-the-new-cold-war speech in Moscow.
He never mentioned Mr. Obama by name, but Mr. Medvedev said he would deploy short-range missiles near Poland capable of striking NATO territory if the United States pressed ahead with plans to build a missile defense shield in Europe, something that Mr. Obama has said he supports.
Mr. Medvedev put Mr. Obama on notice on the Georgia crisis as well, vowing that “we shall not retreat in the Caucasus.”
Even his one-paragraph congratulatory telegram to Mr. Obama was brusque. “I hope for a constructive dialogue with you, based on trust and consideration of each other’s interests,” Mr. Medvedev wrote.
“It was a giant, ‘Hey, welcome to the game,’ ” said George Friedman, chief executive at Stratfor, a geopolitical risk analysis company. “While Obama would like to deal sequentially with Iraq, Afghanistan and, when he gets to it, the Russians, the Russians themselves want to be a burning issue at the top of his list.”
Mr. Obama, for his part, has yet to respond to the Russian chest-thumping, and he probably will not do so until after his inauguration, his advisers said.
“We only have one president at a time,” Mr. Obama said during a news conference on Friday, responding to a question about whether he would soon meet with foes of the United States. “I want to make sure that we are sending the world one message.”
Since winning the election, the Obama team has taken pains not to say anything publicly that could signal Mr. Obama’s thinking on the many major foreign policy issues lined up before him.
The reasons are twofold.
Many of those advisers are privately hoping for positions in his administration, and they do not want to jeopardize their chances by talking freely with reporters.
More significantly, Mr. Obama himself is still making the transition from campaign oratory — and in the case of Russia, very strong campaign oratory — to the more nuanced approach that many advisers say will be necessary for him to navigate what are bound to be contentious relationships.
But some of his comments during the campaign may already have boxed him in.
When Russia invaded Georgia in August, Mr. Obama’s initial response, drafted just before he left for vacation in Hawaii, was nuanced, urging both nations to exercise restraint. His statement was similar to the State Department’s initial, equally nuanced response, which also did not immediately blame Russia.
The Republicans’ presumptive nominee, Senator John McCain, responded with a hard-line approach, saying that Russia had crossed “an internationally recognized border into the sovereign territory of Georgia” and should “unconditionally cease its military operations and withdraw all forces.”
When the McCain camp criticized Mr. Obama’s response as too measured, Mr. Obama hardened his position. His next statement accused Russia of encroaching on Georgia’s sovereignty. The next day, he said that Russia bore responsibility for the escalation.
By the time of the presidential debates in the fall, Mr. Obama had moved even closer to Mr. McCain on Russia and Georgia, voicing support for Georgia’s entry into NATO, a line in the sand that Russia had dared the West to cross.
Stephen Sestanovich, who was President Clinton’s ambassador at large for the former Soviet Union from 1997 to 2001, said that Mr. Obama’s election may have caused some disquiet in Russia.
“This is a leadership that is not super-comfortable with grass-roots politics,” Mr. Sestanovich, a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations who advised the Obama campaign, said of the Russians. “I had a Russian friend e-mail me right afterwards, a short e-mail, and one of the one-word sentences used was ‘envy.’ So that’s how a real democracy works.”
Mr. Obama has options to distance himself from his hawkish remarks on Russia during the campaign, foreign policy experts said. For one thing, while he can continue to support the idea of Georgia becoming part of NATO, the reality is that for now the Europeans will not go along.
Beyond that, Mr. Obama could try to strike more benign agreements that Russians might find soothing, like pushing again for Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization and working with Moscow toward a way out of the missile defense morass. One possibility would be to offer to delay deployment of a missile shield in Poland until an Iranian nuclear threat — which Washington says is its reason for existing — has actually materialized, instead of doing so immediately.
The Bush administration might even lend a hand; it offered several new proposals to the Russians on Friday, including an offer for Russian military officials to inspect the new installations planned in Poland and the Czech Republic for the new missile defense system.
What Mr. Obama will not be able to do, foreign policy experts said, is cede the former Soviet republics and satellites in Eastern Europe back into the orbit of what the Russians like to call their near abroad.
It is a full plate, and all a long way from Mr. Obama’s first dip into Russia policy, when he joined the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee and traveled to Russia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan on a 2005 summer tour with Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, the Republican foreign policy statesman.
At the Council of Foreign Relations later, the men described their trip, during which they hiked through nuclear weapons storage sites, picked through piles of mortar rounds and land mines, and toured missile elimination facilities.
Mr. Obama deferred to Mr. Lugar often, according to people who attended the session; it was clear, they said, who was the old foreign policy hand, and who was the junior senator. Shortly after, Mr. Obama joined Mr. Lugar in introducing legislation designed to keep stockpiles of weapons in the former Soviet Union from getting into the hands of terrorists.
Mr. Obama’s focus on “loose nukes,” foreign policy experts say, seems almost quaint today.
zaterdag 8 november 2008
vrijdag 7 november 2008
Russia Studies New US Missile Defense Proposal
The United States has presented Russia new plans for a missile defense system in the hopes of mollifying Moscow's objections to the program and salvaging nuclear control accords between the two nations.
Russia's Foreign Ministry confirmed Friday, Nov. 7, it has received the proposal and a spokesman said Moscow was studying it. It will be discussed when the US and Russian defense and foreign ministers meet for their next round of two-plus-two format talks. No date for the talks has been scheduled yet although Sergei Ryabkov, Russia's deputy foreign minister, said they could take place within the next two weeks.
Washington's overture comes after Russia threatened action, should the United States set up components of the missile defense system in eastern Europe. Relations between Moscow and Washington have plummeted during George W. Bush's presidency, especially after the military conflict between Russia and US ally Georgia in August.
On Wednesday, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev lashed out at the United States in a hawkish state-of-the-nation speech and said Moscow would deploy short-range Iskander missiles in its European enclave of Kaliningrad on the border with Poland to "neutralize" the planned US shield.
New access
John Rood, US Under Secretary of State for arms control and international security, said Thursday that the fresh proposal built on previous compromises that would allow the Russian military greater access to elements of the missile shield to be located in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Under the US proposals, Russian officials would be allowed to go to the missile defense sites and "see for themselves that the sites are going to serve the purpose that we envision in the United States," Rood said.
He added the United States has put forth plans to replace a key Cold War-era Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) when it expires in December 2009.
Rood is set to meet his Russian counterpart Ryabkov in Moscow later this month to discuss the proposals.
"We are looking forward to a robust dialogue with the Russians," Rood told Reuters news agency.
Too late?
But at least one US arms control expert has said the Bush administration, which leaves office on Jan. 20, has run out of the time and influence it needs to successfully negotiate with the Russians.
The Russians "will wait and see what the next administration (of President-elect Barack Obama) has to offer," Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, told Reuters.
The Bush administration has so far failed to convince Moscow that its missile shield poses no threat to its security. Washington says the defense system is needed to provide protection against "rogue" states, such as Iran.
Obama has said he supports work on a system that protects the US and its allies from missile attacks, but has added that any such system must be "pragmatic and cost-effective." The president-elect has said he will see verifiable reductions in all US and Russian nuclear systems during his administration.
zondag 2 november 2008
Russians deploying in Libya
Libya has offered Russia a naval base in the Mediterranean as the two countries moved to rebuild defence and economic ties.
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi reportedly made the offer to Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev during their talks in the Kremlin on Saturday.
Mr. Qadhafi is paying his first visit to Russia since 1985.
Mr. Medvedev described relations with Libya as “comradely” and voiced confidence Mr. Qadhafi’s visit would “give a new impetus” to bilateral ties.
“Russia is returning to strategically important regions of the world,” said First Deputy-Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defence, Yuri Savenko, while commenting on the Russian-Libyan parleys.
Libya sees a Russian naval base in the port of Benghazi as a guarantee of non-aggression from the U.S, said Russian business daily Kommersant.
Russian warships docked in Libya this month before heading for Venezuela to take part in joint naval exercises.
“Russia is interested in getting access to naval bases in the Mediterranean as this would expand the operational reach of our Navy,” said Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, former deputy Navy commander of the former Soviet Union and Russia.
Russia also plans to build a naval base at the Syrian port Tartus in the eastern Mediterranean.
Reports said Libya plans to buy $2-billion worth of Russian air defence systems, fighter jets, tanks and combat helicopters, as well as to upgrade its Soviet-built weapons, which account for 90 per cent of its arsenals.
Russia is doing business with Libya and Syria. One would argue that these countries are not that friendly to the West.
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi reportedly made the offer to Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev during their talks in the Kremlin on Saturday.
Mr. Qadhafi is paying his first visit to Russia since 1985.
Mr. Medvedev described relations with Libya as “comradely” and voiced confidence Mr. Qadhafi’s visit would “give a new impetus” to bilateral ties.
“Russia is returning to strategically important regions of the world,” said First Deputy-Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defence, Yuri Savenko, while commenting on the Russian-Libyan parleys.
Libya sees a Russian naval base in the port of Benghazi as a guarantee of non-aggression from the U.S, said Russian business daily Kommersant.
Russian warships docked in Libya this month before heading for Venezuela to take part in joint naval exercises.
“Russia is interested in getting access to naval bases in the Mediterranean as this would expand the operational reach of our Navy,” said Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, former deputy Navy commander of the former Soviet Union and Russia.
Russia also plans to build a naval base at the Syrian port Tartus in the eastern Mediterranean.
Reports said Libya plans to buy $2-billion worth of Russian air defence systems, fighter jets, tanks and combat helicopters, as well as to upgrade its Soviet-built weapons, which account for 90 per cent of its arsenals.
Russia is doing business with Libya and Syria. One would argue that these countries are not that friendly to the West.
zaterdag 1 november 2008
Obama and McCain on Russia
Neither of the two major American presidential candidates has seriously addressed, or even seems fully aware of, what should be our greatest foreign policy concern--Russia's singular capacity to endanger or enhance our national security. Overshadowed by the US disaster in Iraq, Moscow's importance will continue long after that war ends.
Despite its diminished status following the Soviet breakup in 1991, Russia alone possesses weapons that can destroy the United States, a military-industrial complex nearly America's equal in exporting arms, vast quantities of questionably secured nuclear materials sought by terrorists and the planet's largest oil and natural gas reserves. It also remains the world's largest territorial country, pivotally situated in the West and the East, at the crossroads of colliding civilizations, with strategic capabilities from Europe, Iran and other Middle East nations to North Korea, China, India, Afghanistan and even Latin America. All things considered, our national security may depend more on Russia than Russia's does on us.
And yet US-Russian relations are worse today than they have been in twenty years. The relationship includes almost as many serious conflicts as it did during the cold war--among them, Kosovo, Iran, the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia, Venezuela, NATO expansion, missile defense, access to oil and the Kremlin's internal politics--and less actual cooperation, particularly in essential matters involving nuclear weapons. Indeed, a growing number of observers on both sides think the relationship is verging on a new cold war, including another arms race.
Even the current cold peace could be more dangerous than its predecessor, for three reasons: First, its front line is not in Berlin or the Third World but on Russia's own borders, where US and NATO military power is increasingly ensconced. Second, lethal dangers inherent in Moscow's impaired controls over its vast stockpiles of materials of mass destruction and thousands of missiles on hair-trigger alert, a legacy of the state's disintegration in the 1990s, exceed any such threats in the past. And third, also unlike before, there is no effective domestic opposition to hawkish policies in Washington or Moscow, only influential proponents and cheerleaders.
How did it come to this?
Less than twenty years ago, in 1989-90, the Soviet Russian and American leaders, Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush, completing a process begun by Gorbachev and President Reagan, agreed to end the cold war, with "no winners and no losers," as even Condoleezza Rice once wrote, and begin a new era of "genuine cooperation." In the US policy elite and media, the nearly unanimous answer is that Russian President Vladimir Putin's antidemocratic domestic policies and "neo-imperialism" destroyed that historic opportunity.
You don't have to be a Putin apologist to understand that this is not an adequate explanation. During the last eight years, Putin's foreign policies have been largely a reaction to Washington's winner-take-all approach to Moscow since the early 1990s, which resulted from a revised US view of how the cold war ended [see Cohen, "The New American Cold War," July 10, 2006]. In that new triumphalist narrative, America "won" the forty-year conflict and post-Soviet Russia was a defeated nation analogous to post-World War II Germany and Japan--a nation without full sovereignty at home or autonomous national interests abroad.
The policy implication of that bipartisan triumphalism, which persists today, has been clear, certainly to Moscow. It meant that the United States had the right to oversee Russia's post-Communist political and economic development, as it tried to do directly in the 1990s, while demanding that Moscow yield to US international interests. It meant Washington could break strategic promises to Moscow, as when the Clinton Administration began NATO's eastward expansion, and disregard extraordinary Kremlin overtures, as when the Bush Administration unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty and granted NATO membership to countries even closer to Russia--despite Putin's crucial assistance to the US war effort in Afghanistan after September 11. It even meant America was entitled to Russia's traditional sphere of security and energy supplies, from the Baltics, Ukraine and Georgia to Central Asia and the Caspian.
Such US behavior was bound to produce a Russian backlash. It came under Putin, but it would have been the reaction of any strong Kremlin leader, regardless of soaring world oil prices. And it can no longer be otherwise. Those US policies--widely viewed in Moscow as an "encirclement" designed to keep Russia weak and to control its resources--have helped revive an assertive Russian nationalism, destroy the once strong pro-American lobby and inspire widespread charges that concessions to Washington are "appeasement," even "capitulationism."
The Kremlin may have overreacted, but the cause and effect threatening a new cold war are clear.
Because the first steps in this direction were taken in Washington, so must be initiatives to reverse it. Three are essential and urgent: a US diplomacy that treats Russia as a sovereign great power with commensurate national interests; an end to NATO expansion before it reaches Ukraine, which would risk something worse than cold war; and a full resumption of negotiations to sharply reduce and fully secure all nuclear stockpiles and to prevent the impending arms race, which requires ending or agreeing on US plans for a missile defense system in Europe. My recent discussions with members of Moscow's policy elite suggest, whether Russia's real leader is its new President Dmitri Medvedev or Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, that there may still be time for such initiatives to elicit Kremlin responses that would enhance rather than further endanger our national security.
American presidential campaigns are supposed to discuss such vital issues, but neither Senator McCain nor Senator Obama has done so. Instead, in varying degrees, both have promised to be "tougher" on the Kremlin than George W. Bush has allegedly been and to continue the encirclement of Russia and the hectoring "democracy promotion" there, which have only undermined US security and Russian democracy since the 1990s.
To be fair, no influential actors in American politics, including the media, have asked the candidates about any of these crucial issues. They should do so now before another chance is lost, in Washington and in Moscow.
Despite its diminished status following the Soviet breakup in 1991, Russia alone possesses weapons that can destroy the United States, a military-industrial complex nearly America's equal in exporting arms, vast quantities of questionably secured nuclear materials sought by terrorists and the planet's largest oil and natural gas reserves. It also remains the world's largest territorial country, pivotally situated in the West and the East, at the crossroads of colliding civilizations, with strategic capabilities from Europe, Iran and other Middle East nations to North Korea, China, India, Afghanistan and even Latin America. All things considered, our national security may depend more on Russia than Russia's does on us.
And yet US-Russian relations are worse today than they have been in twenty years. The relationship includes almost as many serious conflicts as it did during the cold war--among them, Kosovo, Iran, the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia, Venezuela, NATO expansion, missile defense, access to oil and the Kremlin's internal politics--and less actual cooperation, particularly in essential matters involving nuclear weapons. Indeed, a growing number of observers on both sides think the relationship is verging on a new cold war, including another arms race.
Even the current cold peace could be more dangerous than its predecessor, for three reasons: First, its front line is not in Berlin or the Third World but on Russia's own borders, where US and NATO military power is increasingly ensconced. Second, lethal dangers inherent in Moscow's impaired controls over its vast stockpiles of materials of mass destruction and thousands of missiles on hair-trigger alert, a legacy of the state's disintegration in the 1990s, exceed any such threats in the past. And third, also unlike before, there is no effective domestic opposition to hawkish policies in Washington or Moscow, only influential proponents and cheerleaders.
How did it come to this?
Less than twenty years ago, in 1989-90, the Soviet Russian and American leaders, Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush, completing a process begun by Gorbachev and President Reagan, agreed to end the cold war, with "no winners and no losers," as even Condoleezza Rice once wrote, and begin a new era of "genuine cooperation." In the US policy elite and media, the nearly unanimous answer is that Russian President Vladimir Putin's antidemocratic domestic policies and "neo-imperialism" destroyed that historic opportunity.
You don't have to be a Putin apologist to understand that this is not an adequate explanation. During the last eight years, Putin's foreign policies have been largely a reaction to Washington's winner-take-all approach to Moscow since the early 1990s, which resulted from a revised US view of how the cold war ended [see Cohen, "The New American Cold War," July 10, 2006]. In that new triumphalist narrative, America "won" the forty-year conflict and post-Soviet Russia was a defeated nation analogous to post-World War II Germany and Japan--a nation without full sovereignty at home or autonomous national interests abroad.
The policy implication of that bipartisan triumphalism, which persists today, has been clear, certainly to Moscow. It meant that the United States had the right to oversee Russia's post-Communist political and economic development, as it tried to do directly in the 1990s, while demanding that Moscow yield to US international interests. It meant Washington could break strategic promises to Moscow, as when the Clinton Administration began NATO's eastward expansion, and disregard extraordinary Kremlin overtures, as when the Bush Administration unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty and granted NATO membership to countries even closer to Russia--despite Putin's crucial assistance to the US war effort in Afghanistan after September 11. It even meant America was entitled to Russia's traditional sphere of security and energy supplies, from the Baltics, Ukraine and Georgia to Central Asia and the Caspian.
Such US behavior was bound to produce a Russian backlash. It came under Putin, but it would have been the reaction of any strong Kremlin leader, regardless of soaring world oil prices. And it can no longer be otherwise. Those US policies--widely viewed in Moscow as an "encirclement" designed to keep Russia weak and to control its resources--have helped revive an assertive Russian nationalism, destroy the once strong pro-American lobby and inspire widespread charges that concessions to Washington are "appeasement," even "capitulationism."
The Kremlin may have overreacted, but the cause and effect threatening a new cold war are clear.
Because the first steps in this direction were taken in Washington, so must be initiatives to reverse it. Three are essential and urgent: a US diplomacy that treats Russia as a sovereign great power with commensurate national interests; an end to NATO expansion before it reaches Ukraine, which would risk something worse than cold war; and a full resumption of negotiations to sharply reduce and fully secure all nuclear stockpiles and to prevent the impending arms race, which requires ending or agreeing on US plans for a missile defense system in Europe. My recent discussions with members of Moscow's policy elite suggest, whether Russia's real leader is its new President Dmitri Medvedev or Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, that there may still be time for such initiatives to elicit Kremlin responses that would enhance rather than further endanger our national security.
American presidential campaigns are supposed to discuss such vital issues, but neither Senator McCain nor Senator Obama has done so. Instead, in varying degrees, both have promised to be "tougher" on the Kremlin than George W. Bush has allegedly been and to continue the encirclement of Russia and the hectoring "democracy promotion" there, which have only undermined US security and Russian democracy since the 1990s.
To be fair, no influential actors in American politics, including the media, have asked the candidates about any of these crucial issues. They should do so now before another chance is lost, in Washington and in Moscow.
vrijdag 31 oktober 2008
Ingushetia has a new leader
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev today replaced the leader of the violent southern region of Ingushetia, a man analysts said had aggravated an Islamist insurgency with his heavy-handed rule.
Fighting between security forces and rebels in Ingushetia has escalated this year, pushing the mainly Muslim region governed by Murat Zyazikov towards a civil war which could destabilise the entire north Caucasus.
Zyazikov, a former KGB-colonel handpicked by former Russian president Vladimir Putin to govern Ingushetia from 2002, was replaced by Yunis-Bek Yevkurov, a relatively unknown deputy chief of staff for the Volga-Urals military district, as Ingushetia's interim president, the Kremlin announced.
Zyazikov denied earlier news agency reports that he had been sacked.
"I absolutely voluntarily resigned in order to transfer to other work," he told the Interfax news agency. "I will work in Moscow."
The Kremlin later released a statement stating Medvedev had accepted Zyazikov's resignation request, but Moscow-based analyst Pavel Felgenhauer said the decision would have been taken by Putin, now Russia's prime minister.
"Zyazikov was a Putin protege at the FSB (successor to the KGB) and this decision would have been made by Putin," he said.
"The situation in Ingushetia is out of control," Felgenhauer added, speaking of the region which borders Chechnya.
"The vast majority of the people are against Zyazikov and that has helped the underground Islamists. There is lots of personal anger against him."
Residents of Ingushetia's main city Nazran celebrated news of Zyazikov's departure in the streets – normally deserted at night.
Rusting cars sped over potholes and played loud music while groups of men danced and waved Ingushetia's flag.
"I hope that everything in Ingushetia will stabilise now," one policeman said. "Everything that is happening here is in the hands of Moscow."
In a village outside Nazran a group of old men said they had been waiting for this moment for a long time.
"If we had a normal president we would have order here. There can be nobody as bad as Zyazikov," one man said.
Kidnappings, murder and bomb attacks have become a part of everyday life in Ingushetia as security forces combat increasing rebel activity by clamping down on locals, heavy-handed tactics which people and human rights workers say has boosted support for the insurgents.
Human rights groups estimate that 93 people had been killed up to the end of August this year in Ingushetia, Russia's smallest region with a population of 470,000.
This man, Yevkurov, is unknown to us. If a reader should have more information about him, do not hesitate to submit.
Fighting between security forces and rebels in Ingushetia has escalated this year, pushing the mainly Muslim region governed by Murat Zyazikov towards a civil war which could destabilise the entire north Caucasus.
Zyazikov, a former KGB-colonel handpicked by former Russian president Vladimir Putin to govern Ingushetia from 2002, was replaced by Yunis-Bek Yevkurov, a relatively unknown deputy chief of staff for the Volga-Urals military district, as Ingushetia's interim president, the Kremlin announced.
Zyazikov denied earlier news agency reports that he had been sacked.
"I absolutely voluntarily resigned in order to transfer to other work," he told the Interfax news agency. "I will work in Moscow."
The Kremlin later released a statement stating Medvedev had accepted Zyazikov's resignation request, but Moscow-based analyst Pavel Felgenhauer said the decision would have been taken by Putin, now Russia's prime minister.
"Zyazikov was a Putin protege at the FSB (successor to the KGB) and this decision would have been made by Putin," he said.
"The situation in Ingushetia is out of control," Felgenhauer added, speaking of the region which borders Chechnya.
"The vast majority of the people are against Zyazikov and that has helped the underground Islamists. There is lots of personal anger against him."
Residents of Ingushetia's main city Nazran celebrated news of Zyazikov's departure in the streets – normally deserted at night.
Rusting cars sped over potholes and played loud music while groups of men danced and waved Ingushetia's flag.
"I hope that everything in Ingushetia will stabilise now," one policeman said. "Everything that is happening here is in the hands of Moscow."
In a village outside Nazran a group of old men said they had been waiting for this moment for a long time.
"If we had a normal president we would have order here. There can be nobody as bad as Zyazikov," one man said.
Kidnappings, murder and bomb attacks have become a part of everyday life in Ingushetia as security forces combat increasing rebel activity by clamping down on locals, heavy-handed tactics which people and human rights workers say has boosted support for the insurgents.
Human rights groups estimate that 93 people had been killed up to the end of August this year in Ingushetia, Russia's smallest region with a population of 470,000.
This man, Yevkurov, is unknown to us. If a reader should have more information about him, do not hesitate to submit.
Stolen Russian nuclear weapons
Moscow denies Pentagon claims of 'stolen' Russian nuclear weapons
Russia's Foreign Ministry denied on Friday claims by the U.S. defense secretary that large amounts of Russian nuclear weapons had been stolen or misplaced.
Speaking in Washington on Tuesday at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Robert Gates expressed concern that some Russian nuclear weapons from the former Soviet arsenal may not be fully accounted for.
"I have fairly high confidence that no strategic or modern tactical nuclear weapons have leaked beyond Russian borders," Gates said.
"What worries me are the tens of thousands of old nuclear mines, nuclear artillery shells and so on, because the reality is the Russians themselves probably don't have any idea how many of those they have or, potentially, where they are," he added.
"Such allegations are entirely groundless," the ministry's press and information department said in a statement.
"Despite all the difficulties that our country faced in the early 1990s, Russia maintained very high standards of ensuring the safety and physical protection of its nuclear arsenals," the statement said.
"In this respect, we would like to reiterate that in a joint statement on nuclear security signed by the Russian and U.S. leaders in Bratislava in 2005 both sides acknowledged that the protection of nuclear facilities in both countries meets modern norms and requirements," it said.
In his remarks, Gates also supported the necessity of new talks with Moscow on further strategic arms reductions, which have been advocated by both current U.S. presidential candidates, Republican John McCain and Democrat Barack Obama.
Negotiated and signed in 1991, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is scheduled to expire on December 5, 2009. Under that accord, the United States and Russia have significantly reduced their number of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.
Many experts believe that if START expires without replacement verification measures, the two countries will be "flying blind" in their nuclear relations.
dinsdag 28 oktober 2008
Russia promises to support the ruble
Russia promises to support the ruble
Russia will not allow the ruble to fall dramatically, an influential government minister said Monday in response to rising fears that the national currency is headed for a devaluation.
A sharp drop in the ruble would mean that Russia "has broken its promises to the people," said First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov. "Everything that people have earned should be safe."
If necessary, Russia will continue to spend billions of dollars to shore up its currency, and the band within which the ruble trades is not going to be widened, said Shuvalov, the top deputy to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Many Russians have rushed to convert their savings into dollars as they did in the 1998 economic crisis when the value of the ruble dropped fourfold and inflation surged to 80 percent.
They have withdrawn rubles from their bank accounts and bought dollars at well above the official rates as fears mounted that the Kremlin would allow the ruble to float against international currencies and prove unable to prevent a crash.
The ruble has declined steadily since the Aug. 7 start of the five-day war with Georgia, losing some 13 percent of its value against the dollar. Without intervention by the Central Bank, which began in early September, it might have fallen farther and faster.
The Central Bank is estimated to have spent as much as $15 billion per week in recent weeks to buy rubles and support the exchange rate.
Shuvalov said Monday that Russia still has more than $500 billion in foreign currency and gold reserves, and the government is "not afraid of running out of money."
The ruble has come under pressure as the government starts to feel the impact of falling oil prices. Until this summer, the ruble had been gaining for several years on the back of higher commodities prices, especially oil and gas. The ruble strengthened to 23.14 against the dollar in July, its highest level in 9 years. But the currency's fortunes have reversed dramatically in the past three months and traded at 27.3 rubles at the MICEX stock exchange on Monday.
Russia's Central Bank pegs the ruble to a so-called "currency basket" of the dollar and the euro, allowing it to float only within a narrow range. The dollar accounts for 55 percent and the euro for 45 percent in the basket. The aim is to avoid the economic shock of sudden swings in the currency's value.
Unlike the dollar, the euro has lost some 8 percent against the ruble in the past six months.
In an attempt to restore confidence in the ruble, the Kremlin-friendly Izvestia newspaper published a guide Monday on investing during the financial crisis that discouraged readers from buying the dollar.
"If you believe in the U.S. currency well, good luck," the article said. "Remember that all the talk about diversification is for professionals."
Izvestia quoted an economics expert as saying that a higher dollar is a "temporary thing" and that the United States will not announce a default but "might decide to take $50 and $100 bank notes out of circulation," turning all of your dollar savings into a "souvenir."
The newspaper suggested investing into "something with good prospects" such as paying rent and utilities bills for three months ahead and paying off all loans. Another piece of advice was to "invest this money in your own beloved self" by splashing out on a health club membership or expensive medical treatment.
Russia will not allow the ruble to fall dramatically, an influential government minister said Monday in response to rising fears that the national currency is headed for a devaluation.
A sharp drop in the ruble would mean that Russia "has broken its promises to the people," said First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov. "Everything that people have earned should be safe."
If necessary, Russia will continue to spend billions of dollars to shore up its currency, and the band within which the ruble trades is not going to be widened, said Shuvalov, the top deputy to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Many Russians have rushed to convert their savings into dollars as they did in the 1998 economic crisis when the value of the ruble dropped fourfold and inflation surged to 80 percent.
They have withdrawn rubles from their bank accounts and bought dollars at well above the official rates as fears mounted that the Kremlin would allow the ruble to float against international currencies and prove unable to prevent a crash.
The ruble has declined steadily since the Aug. 7 start of the five-day war with Georgia, losing some 13 percent of its value against the dollar. Without intervention by the Central Bank, which began in early September, it might have fallen farther and faster.
The Central Bank is estimated to have spent as much as $15 billion per week in recent weeks to buy rubles and support the exchange rate.
Shuvalov said Monday that Russia still has more than $500 billion in foreign currency and gold reserves, and the government is "not afraid of running out of money."
The ruble has come under pressure as the government starts to feel the impact of falling oil prices. Until this summer, the ruble had been gaining for several years on the back of higher commodities prices, especially oil and gas. The ruble strengthened to 23.14 against the dollar in July, its highest level in 9 years. But the currency's fortunes have reversed dramatically in the past three months and traded at 27.3 rubles at the MICEX stock exchange on Monday.
Russia's Central Bank pegs the ruble to a so-called "currency basket" of the dollar and the euro, allowing it to float only within a narrow range. The dollar accounts for 55 percent and the euro for 45 percent in the basket. The aim is to avoid the economic shock of sudden swings in the currency's value.
Unlike the dollar, the euro has lost some 8 percent against the ruble in the past six months.
In an attempt to restore confidence in the ruble, the Kremlin-friendly Izvestia newspaper published a guide Monday on investing during the financial crisis that discouraged readers from buying the dollar.
"If you believe in the U.S. currency well, good luck," the article said. "Remember that all the talk about diversification is for professionals."
Izvestia quoted an economics expert as saying that a higher dollar is a "temporary thing" and that the United States will not announce a default but "might decide to take $50 and $100 bank notes out of circulation," turning all of your dollar savings into a "souvenir."
The newspaper suggested investing into "something with good prospects" such as paying rent and utilities bills for three months ahead and paying off all loans. Another piece of advice was to "invest this money in your own beloved self" by splashing out on a health club membership or expensive medical treatment.
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